Recent perspectival interpretations of Kant suggest a way of relating his epistemology to empirical science that makes it plausible to regard Einstein's theory of relativity as having a Kantian grounding. This first of two articles exploring this topic focuses on how the foregoing hypothesis accounts for various resonances between Kant's philosophy and Einstein's science.
Kant's System of Perspectives as the Grounding for Modern Scientific Revolutions
In the course of defending Albert Einstein's revolutionary approach to physics, and perhaps also as an implicit affirmation of Einstein's religious worldview, Sir Arthur Eddington boldly asserted: "There are absolute things in the world but you must look deeply Eddington's statement) that enabled him to discover the theory of relativity. Kant's philosophy, with its "Critical" method, 2 establishes a worldview whereby religion and science can coexist. What I have elsewhere called his "Critical mysticism" 3 is only quasimystical, inasmuch as the qualification "Critical" requires anything we say about the mystery of the unknown (the "thing in itself") to be constrained and circumscribed by what is known.
If we take into account the delicate balance between the knowable and unknowable in Kant's philosophy, we may find that the modern revolutions in science that challenge the classical theories (especially to Euclidean geometry and Newtonian physics) are each rooted in Kant's philosophy. With this possibility in mind, I shall examine various resonances between Kant and Einstein, the first and foremost being that both acknowledge a basic mystery underlying nature yet clearly distinguish between the scientific disposition that employs language to construct empirical knowledge of nature (this being the focus of the present article) and the religious disposition that contemplates and appreciates this mystery as it is in itself (an issue addressed in Part II [see note 79, below] by making the opposite (Copernican or "Transcendental") assumption: to understand the philosophical foundations of knowledge, we must assume that the objects of knowledge conform to (i.e., are themselves shaped by) the mental powers of the knowing subject. Kant defends this hypothesis with numerous arguments. As with all perspectival revolutions, the best proof is how effectively it helps us solve philosophical, scientific, and religious problems; the more insights a paradigm shift provides for philosophy, science, and religion, the more we can trust its adequacy and regard it as a reliable starting-point for empirical understanding in general (i.e., the more effectively it functions as a "worldview").
My hypothesis is that the scientific revolutions since Kant's day, far from disproving the legitimacy of Kant's epistemology and philosophy of science (as commentators so often assume), can be interpreted as applications of his philosophical worldview to geometry, arithmetic, logic, physics, quantum mechanics, cosmology, biology, psychology, medicine, etc. 7 The most obvious objection to this hypothesis is that Kant presupposes the legitimacy of an entirely classical worldview, supported by Euclidean geometry, Aristotelian logic, and For our present concerns the most important example is that, although Kant accepts the basic tenets of Newton's laws of physics as empirically established principles, he rejects as untenable the philosophical worldview Newton assumes as its background: that space has an absolute, self-sufficient reality that we can distinguish both from ourselves and from the reality of an equally absolute time. In direct opposition to this philosophical position, called "transcendental realism", Kant defends a two-sided theory called both "transcendental idealism" and "empirical realism". According to Kant, both space and time must be viewed, from the transcendental perspective, as "forms of intuition" that our mind imposes onto the world. All objects of human knowledge must present themselves in spatio-temporal form, he argues, because viewed from the transcendental perspective, we impose this form onto empirical objects. 9 The transcendental conditions are precisely what enable us observers to regard objects in space and time as independently real from the empirical perspective. 18 The sole evidence he cites when making such comments is that "Kant's apriorism" and "Poincare's conventionalism" are "opposite points of view". 19 As I shall argue in §2 of Part II, however, these two views of science need not be contradictory, inasmuch as Kant's philosophy makes room for both, applied in different ways.
Kant argues that Euclidean geometry's necessary and universal character derives not from any empirical connection between objects but from the subjective constitution of our perceptual capacity. This is compatible with Einstein's view of geometry: both distinguish between the geometry that can be described (or pictured)-in its purest form, Euclidean geometry-and the actual (yet ultimately imperceptible) geometry underlying the empirical world. Kant insists that the latter (probably one of Eddington's "absolutes"), insofar as we regard the world as a thing in itself, is unknowable; Einstein is equally insistent that the scientist's theories about this world-geometrical and otherwise-remain hypothetical and 
Kant's Influence on Einstein's Early Intellectual Development
Einstein once recalled the "wonder" he "experienced as a child of 4 or 5 years, when my father showed me a compass.... Something deeply hidden had to be behind things." 32 This intuitive awareness of an obscure "something" that is revealed in our experience of symmetries in nature, yet without allowing itself to be expressed in language, is akin to Kant's "thing in itself". 33 For Kant, the thing in itself is a conceptual construct referring to the natural world, with all the conditions that allow us to conceptualize or describe what we experience abstracted from it. This mysterious reality that must underlie the natural world, if we are to escape Berkeleyan idealism, serves as a paradoxical grounding for the fundamental assumption of Kant's worldview, the "Copernican" Perspective that generates his new methodology for understanding how scientific knowledge arises, through the structuring "compass-points" of the categories-these being the forms we must use to understand the symmetries we experience (see note 33).
In light of his childhood experience of the universe's "deeply hidden" forces, young
Albert must have been intrigued by this theory of the thing in itself, the necessarily hidden (i.e., unknowable) absolute underlying our understanding of nature, when he first read Kant Einstein confesses his need to "tone down 'a priori' into 'conventional' in order not to have to contradict myself". 59 Although it was tempting to be "ensnared" by Kant, because his philosophy "is very nice reading," it is still "not as fine as his predecessor Hume, who also had considerably more common sense." 60 The latter claim is impossible to assess without knowing what Einstein meant by "common sense". It likely indicates that Einstein thought
Hume led a more interesting life than Kant-a fact that has nothing to do with the veracity of their respective philosophical theories, nor with the question of which theory provides a more reliable grounding for the subsequent developments of empirical science. However, it does raise a crucial question that calls for an answer before we proceed any further: if Einstein's worldview really is grounded in Kant's philosophy, why was Einstein so reluctant to admit this influence and acknowledge the resonances that others have so clearly seen?
Einstein's Reluctance to Acknowledge Kant's Influence
Einstein's tendency to downplay Kant's influence in favor of Spinoza and other non- former book about the formation of the solar system, the nature of galaxies, and other speculations that later turned out to be confirmed by empirical evidence, and in light of the revolutionary Copernican hypothesis Kant proposes in the latter book, "it's obvious that [Einstein] was already thinking seriously about" issues that later led him to propose "his theory of special relativity". 64 When he arranged to join his parents in Milan six months later, "Einstein had become fascinated by philosophy after reading Kant", so much that "[h]e told his father he would like to teach philosophy"! 65 Fortunately for the world of physics, "his practical-minded father" strongly disapproved of such a plan, pointing young Albert in the direction of engineering instead. 66 For the next decade, after all at once giving up his home country, his love of Kant, and his dream of teaching philosophy, Einstein lived in obscurity, first as a university student and high school mathematics teacher, then (starting in 1902) as an employee of the Swiss patent office in Bern.
After publishing five ground-breaking papers in 1905, Einstein skyrocketed to fame.
His "sudden worldwide fame was unparalleled, especially for a physicist or mathematician….
From 1919 on he was without question the world's most famous and celebrated scientist, the most loved and the most hated." 67 Less than a decade after the publication of those five papers, in the political turmoil building up to World War I, 93 German academics signed a engaging in "the personal attacks" against him. 73 In a context where some German colleagues and students would "greet him with obscenities", send death threats, and even "offered a reward to anyone who killed Einstein the pacifist", 74 we should not be surprised that the mature Einstein was reluctant to admit how deeply his worldview was grounded in the ideas of a German philosopher, Kant.
In his old age, Einstein refused to admit any influence from Kant, though he acknowledged that his autobiography, being a work written from the perspective of old age, might not accurately reflect how his experiences seemed when they unfolded. 75 long straight line and all simultaneous occurrences at a given moment are represented by a transversely drawn straight line through that point on the time line, the thus generated surface
